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Cooperation in the Climate Commons
Stefano Carattini*, Simon Levin†, and Alessandro Tavoni‡
Introduction
Many situations in everyday life involve social dilemmas, the solutions to which require coop-
eration.Most of these situations involve the provision of local public goods or themanagement
of common-pool resources. Sustaining cooperation in these settings representsoneof themajor
achievements of our society, since cooperating on social dilemmas requires overcoming the
temptation to free ride. Fromanarrow economic perspective, cooperation represents an anom-
aly that contradicts the ideal of rationality (Dawes and Thaler 1988). Nevertheless, cooperation
is often observed in the real world, suggesting that individuals may be more sophisticated than
predictedby theory (Sen1977).Although for the sakeofmodel parsimony itmaybe tempting to
assume that societies can dispense with morality and civic spirit (Hirschman 1984), under-
standing cooperation is a crucial challenge for economists and policymakers. Thus a growing
literature on cooperative behavior has emerged in recent decades that concerns a range of
economic interactions and different social environments (see Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).
Natural resource management inevitably involves overcoming local dilemmas. From a stan-
dard economic perspective, any situations involving the use of open-access common-pool
resources are viewed as susceptible to free riding, inevitably leading to overexploitation.
While overexploitation has been shown to be an issue in certain situations—for instance, in
competitive environments characterized by open access—other contexts have been found to be
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more conducive to cooperation. As Ostrom (1990) famously demonstrated, cooperative out-
comes can be sustained if stakeholders trust each other and trust is maintained through mon-
itoring and the sanctioning of norm violators. In fact, after surveying much evidence from the
field, Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom (2010) concluded that commons need not turn into trag-
edies. However, this body of work focuses on local commons, where successful management
tends tooccur in situationswhere the actors knowand canobserveone another.What about the
global commons? Can we identify patterns of cooperation that scale up to the global level?
In this article we considermeasures aimed at promoting “climate cooperation,” as revealed
by contributions to the global public good of climate change mitigation. Due to its global
public good nature, climate changemitigation presents the toughest conditions for the emer-
gence and stability of international cooperation; that is, its benefits are enjoyed worldwide,
regardless of who bears its burden. Adding to this challenge, mitigation is also plagued by
temporal externalities, withmitigation todaymostly benefiting future generations. Although
the potential for sustained cooperation among small groups in the local commons is now
widely recognized, free riding is still viewed as the norm in the climate commons. Decades of
largely unsuccessful climate negotiations would appear to support this view (Barrett 1994).
On the other hand, there has thus far been virtually no comprehensive account of the evidence
regarding the extent of cooperative achievements in the climate commons (beyondwhat self-
interested actors would unilaterally do). We aim to fill this gap by reviewing the recent
literature on the economics of environmental cooperation.
A preliminary question is whywe should observe cooperationwhen facing a global dilemma.
According toOstrom (2010), subjectsmay still be willing to cooperate even in a global setting if
they expect others to cooperate aswell. Ostrompresents evidence concerning a number of local
communities and subnational entities that successfully organized and collectively engaged to
mitigate climate change. Recent developments in climate change negotiations—for example,
the ambitious deal struck at the December 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris—
have also triggered renewed interest in cooperation from the bottomup. In fact, this agreement
was built on several years of grassroots efforts and unilateral initiatives, including the broad-
ening use of carbon pricing, which can be seen as costly signals of countries’ willingness to
cooperate. However, only time will reveal how effective the treaty will be in fostering sufficient
emission abatement tomeet its target of limiting global warming to below 2C, and specifically
whether its parties will deliver on their pledges and ratchet up ambition over time.
Because countries’ mitigation pledges, such as the nationally determined contributions in
the Paris Agreement, must be turned into policies, an additional layer of cooperation is
necessary at the domestic level. In order to leverage individuals’ willingness to cooperate,
policymakers need to understandwhen andwhy cooperation in the climate commonsworks.
Thus we examine both the theory and empirical evidence concerning many public good
situations that have implications for climate mitigation. We also review microeconomic
evidence from empirical studies of the adoption of green technologies, laboratory and field
experiments that leverage social comparison effects to spur environmentally friendly behav-
ior, studies of the demand for carbon offsets, and microeconomic and macroeconomic
analyses of the relationship between trust and environmental outcomes.
By looking at the deep roots of cooperation, we try to identify its drivers in the global
commons. Our review of the literature strives to be extensive, but it is not exhaustive due to
2 S. Carattini et al.
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the large body of cross-disciplinary research that feeds into the topic of climate cooperation.1
By collecting an important set of recent evidence on cooperation in the climate commons,
this review contributes to reconciling different literatures and provides a critical overview of
the potential for scaling up localized cooperation efforts. A number of questions remain
unanswered, highlighting the gaps in the current state of knowledge and avenues for future
research. The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section examines the
theoretical underpinnings of cooperation, beginning with local action, targeted first at local
dilemmas and then at global dilemmas, and finally scaling up to international cooperation for
addressing global dilemmas. Then we present empirical evidence on the role of local social
norms in driving behavior and discuss its implications for climate mitigation. The final
section summarizes the main findings and discusses avenues for future research.
Economic Theory and Cooperation Across Scales
Economics has traditionally been concerned with rational selfishness, under the premise that
the representative Homo economicus pursues their objectives based on narrow self-interest.
This logic underlies the narrowly selfish maximization of utility by consumers and profits by
firms. However, this narrow approach ignores external effects such as environmental degra-
dation, implying that public goods will be underprovided and the commons will be over-
exploited in the absence of private markets or regulation (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968). This
view was well captured by John Stuart Mill (1836), who suggests “an arbitrary definition of
man, as a being who inevitably does that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of
necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical self-
denial with which they can be obtained.”
Social scientists have long questioned the realism of the assumption of selfish rationality as
a pervasive driver of human behavior. The criticisms generally focus on either logical, em-
pirical, or behavioral/psychological grounds. Amartya Sen is an eminent economist who
challenged the logic underpinning selfish rationality. In the 1970s, he criticized the narrow-
ness of the economic man portrayed by the then-dominant rational choice theory; he fa-
mously exposed the illogical extremes towhich self-interested rational “fools”would go in the
following passage, which concerns an encounter between two strangers (Sen 1977, p. 332):
“Where is the railway station?” he asks me. “There,” I say, pointing at the post
office, “and would you please post this letter for me on the way?” “Yes,” he says,
determined to open the envelope and check whether it contains something
valuable.
1Other studies that survey aspects related to climate cooperation include Kraft-Todd et al. (2015), which
reviews field experiments promoting cooperation and examines the importance of the visibility of prosocial
behavior; Nyborg et al. (2016), which extends the discussion of the importance of social norms to several
social dilemmas; Farrow, Grolleau, and Ibanez (2017), which reviews economics and social psychology
studies that manipulate social norms; Tavoni and Levin (2014), which provides a multidisciplinary inves-
tigation of the complexity ofmanaging the climate commons; Drews and van den Bergh (2016), who review
the sociopsychological factors underlying the (un)popularity of carbon taxes; and Carattini, Carvalho, and
Fankhauser (2018), which analyzes the role of information asymmetries and provides a set of stylized facts
suggesting that people tend to overestimate (underestimate) the drawbacks (benefits) of carbon taxes.
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Such a paradoxical situation is indicative of the gap between reality and how neoclassical
economics portrays it by assuming “standard” preferences. In another famous quote,
Laffont (1975, p. 431) illustrates the paradoxical implications of assuming rational self-
interest as the sole guiding principle of human behavior. In introducing Kantian economics,
he asked:
Why is it, then, that (at least in some countries) people do not leave their beer cans
on beaches?
Buchanan (1967, p. 113) argued that people behave in a reciprocal way in the provision of
public goods as follows: “By increasing rather than by decreasing his own contribution, Tizio
may hope that Caio will, over a series of learning and response periods, follow suit and
cooperate in response.” However, it was not until Dawes and Thaler (1988) that the concept
of cooperation entered (with some force) the mainstream economic arena. In their seminal
paper, they labeled cooperation as one of the anomalies that could not be explained by
standard economic theory. While they also presented abundant anecdotal evidence of coop-
erative behavior beyond what rationality predicts, their strongest arguments were based on
the emergent experimental literature, which had already provided robust evidence of behav-
iors that could not be explained by standard economic theory. Dawes and Thaler (1988)
summarized a number of regularities frompublic good games, showing an important role for
altruism and “reciprocal altruism.” In light of the (then) new experimental evidence, the
theory needed to be updated.
In the remainder of this section we review recent work that updates the theory by relaxing
some of the common assumptions in the standard economic model and discuss the impli-
cations of this work for the prospects of achieving cooperation in the climate commons. We
start from the premise that focusing on rational decision making based on pure self-interest
and neglecting contextual drivers of behavior may undermine the goal of achieving behav-
ioral change in a cost-effective way. Scholars in psychology, economics, and philosophy have
long recognized that prosocial preferences and public interventions could interact in a det-
rimental way, potentially leading to motivational crowding out (Deci and Ryan 1985; Frey
1997; Benabou and Tirole 2006). However, one aspect of human behavior that is underap-
preciated is the fact that social and policy interventions can also lead to crowding in (Ostrom
2010). Given that individuals do not respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other
incentives in the simple-minded self-interested way thatHomo economicuswould, the policy
challenge becomes finding effective ways to encourage cooperation while accounting for
motives and ethical considerations. To this end, incentives need to be carefully designed in
order to avoid the pitfall of crowding out goodbehavior, and instead leveraging (crowding in)
prosocial inclinations.
Challenging the Tragedy of the Local Commons
In her influential book, Ostrom (1990) studied the issue of cooperation in local environ-
mental commons. More specifically, she provided evidence that Hardin’s prediction of the
commons ending in tragic overexploitation in the absence of markets (privatization) or
coercion (government intervention) need not materialize, and indeed is only likely to occur
in the presence of additional circumstances, such as open access to the resource as well as
4 S. Carattini et al.
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when there is a lack of norms, informal institutions, and communication opportunities.
While these conditions are likely to be met in large and competitive environments such as
global financial markets, Ostrom (1990) shows that this is hardly the case in many local
commons and formalizes the mechanisms that lead to cooperative outcomes in the manage-
ment of common-pool resources.
Ostrom’s stylized facts about cooperation
Ostrom (2000) provides further evidence challenging the standard economic theory of col-
lective action and, more specifically, the prediction that individuals will not contribute any
positive amounts to the public good (which Ostrom refers to as the “zero-contribution”
prediction arising from individually rational, but collectively inefficient, free riding).
Following the example of Dawes and Thaler (1988), Ostrom (2000) synthesized the emerging
literature in experimental economics, presenting seven stylized facts concerning cooperation
in local settings. We summarize them here because they apply to cooperation more broadly.
First, subjects contribute about 40–60 percent of their endowment to the public good in the
first round of play in repeated (linear) public goods games. Second, even if contributions
decrease in later rounds, on average they do not converge to zero. Third, the belief that others
will contribute increases one’s own contribution to the public good. Fourth, learning helps:
experienced subjects tend to contribute more (over consecutive sessions in which subjects
returned to the lab to play a similar game on a different occasion). Fifth, communication,
even if it does not entail a credible commitment (i.e., it amounts to “cheap talk”) facilitates
cooperation: subjects appear to use it to decrease defection rather than to fool others into
shouldering more of the burden. Sixth, people may be willing to forgo part of their endow-
ment to engage in costly punishment towards noncooperative players. Seventh, contextual
factors, such as the framing of the situation or the use of sanctioning mechanisms, tend to
affect the outcome of the game.
An updated theory of collective action
In an effort to rationalize these stylized facts, Ostrom (2000) sought to develop an updated
theory of collective action. Her call for a new theory is based on the recognition that society
includes a significant fraction of conditional cooperators, whose behavior (unlike that of
“rational egoists”) is compatible with the experimental evidence. The key ingredient of her
theory is trust. That is, conditional cooperators are likely to cooperate so long as they believe
that the other players are trustworthy reciprocators. The presence of conditional cooperators
in society is consistent with insights from evolutionary theories, which suggest that human
beings are inclined to learn social norms, and that with sufficient information on others’
behavior, trustworthy individuals may fare well and spread in societies (Barkow, Cosmides,
and Tooby 1995; Cummins 1996)—to the point that, depending on how precise the signal is,
rational egoists may not survive in an evolutionary process (cf. Axelrod 1986).
Related theories of human behavior that support the idea of cooperation at multiple scales
have developed over the years (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Brekke, Kverndokk, and
Nyborg 2003; Nyborg, Howarth, and Brekke 2006; Roemer 2015). Tabellini (2008) and Dixit
and Levin (2017), among others, attempt to explain why prosocial behavior may emerge and
persist in societies. In the seminal model of Tabellini (2008), parents rationally decide
Cooperation in the Climate Commons 5
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whether to invest effort in educating their children in a prosocial way and transmitting
prosocial values to them, depending on the social environment and the strength of sanction-
ing of noncompliance. InDixit andLevin (2017), the instilment of prosocial preferences is the
result of a collective action effort. Thus this model captures the efforts undertaken by soci-
eties—i.e., not only families—to socialize young individuals in a prosocial fashion (see Bisin
and Verdier [2000, 2001] for other theoretical perspectives). Furthermore, a large body of
knowledge has developed that provides further evidence of cooperative behavior in local
settings (Fehr andG€achter 2000; Fischbacher, G€achter, and Fehr 2001;OstromandAhn 2003;
Kocher et al. 2008; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010; Dixit, Levin, and Rubenstein 2013).
However, it was only after Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 2009 that the updated theory of collective
action received general recognition in mainstream economics.
Scaling Up Cooperation
Although Ostrom’s updated theory of collective action provides useful lessons for governing
local commons, it does not, at first glance, appear to offer insights for managing global
dilemmas. Can this literature help to identify an escape route from the tragedy of the climate
commons?
A partial answer to this question comes from the influential discussion in Ostrom (2010).
First, Ostrom reviews a long list of local, regional, and national efforts aimed at curbing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Then, based on this evidence, she challenges the prediction
of zero contribution in the climate commons, arguing that the standard theory of collective
action may not be well suited to understanding and addressing climate change mitigation.
That is, the limits shown by the standard theory in explaining behavior at the local level may
also have implications for understanding the global commons.
While the empirical part of our review will focus mainly on individual behavior, there are
numerous examples of unilateral political actionundertaken in the climate commonsbynonstate
actors. The United Nations Environment Programme (2015) considers about 200 nonstate cli-
mate initiatives involving more than 20,000 actors, including local governments, the private
sector, and nongovernmental organizations, and finds that these initiatives are associated with
emissions reductions in the range of 2.5–3.3 gigatons of carbon dioxide (CO2)-equivalent.
Ostrom (2010) further argues that norms tend to guide the choice of the appropriate actions
that shouldbe taken in a given context, and individualsmay find it important to gain a reputation
for being trustworthy by adhering to such norms. Over time, reputation may be internalized so
that one’s own self-image is sufficient to evoke behavior that is compatible with the norm. This
suggests that onemay bewilling to contribute to a global public good, for instance, by voluntarily
reducingGHGemissions, provided that there is agreement on the socially desirable behavior, and
that this behavior is at least partly visible (more on this below). Accordingly, societies in which
moderately high levels of cooperation can be sustained (i.e., with a significant fraction of trust-
worthy reciprocators)may be particularly apt andprone to address issues such as climate change.
As a result, the key mechanism that leads local commons to be successfully managed may also
explain (unilateral) efforts toward climate change mitigation.
6 S. Carattini et al.
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Global Agreements Revisited
International environmental agreements have long been modeled in game theory through
coalition-formation games (Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994). The
underlying principle is that the equilibrium number of signatories to a self-enforcing inter-
national agreement follows from the conditions of internal and external stability, whereby no
signatory is better off leaving the coalition and there is no incentive for a nonsignatory to join
the coalition. Such conditions are necessary because treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol (and
to an even greater extent the Paris Agreement) cannot be enforced by external institutions,
due to national sovereignty, and must therefore rely on incentives to ensure compliance.
Strategic complementarity and strategic substitutability
The established insight from the theory of international environmental agreements is that
self-enforcing treaties are unlikely to result in substantial mitigation efforts, especially when
cooperation is most needed (i.e., when the potential gains from cooperation are large due to
high mitigation costs and high mitigation benefits). A more optimistic account is found in
Heal and Kunreuther (2012), who instead investigate the implications of the existence of a
tipping point in the adoption of climate policies by the international community. The
authors provide descriptive evidence on the role of early adopters in triggering a global shift
away from the use of damaging pollutants, such as the unilateral U.S. adoption of unleaded
gasoline to replace leaded gasoline. This unilateral decisionmeant that the subsequent adop-
tion costs for other countries were limited to modifying refinery capacity, since industries
exporting to theU.S. were forced to transition to lead-free fuel immediately after themove by
the early adopter. Strategic complementarity meant that, due to the lower costs for the
followers, the new technology spread quickly worldwide.
Unfortunately, while under certain circumstances some countries (or blocs of countries)
may enjoy strategic complementarities in GHG emission choices, for instance, because they
trade goods with each other (Copeland and Taylor 2003; Eichner and Pethig 2014), GHG
emissions are generally considered to be strategic substitutes. That is, when the marginal
damages from global emissions are increasing, a unilateral reduction in emissions by one
country will be matched by an increase in emissions by the remaining countries (everything
else being equal). This implies that in the absence of a treaty guaranteeing the coordination of
mitigation effort, governments will be reluctant to lead, due to a loss of competitiveness for
the domestic industry relative to the laggards.
This type of situation, which stems from the global public good nature of GHG emission
reductions and the lack of credible supranational authority for enforcing commitments, is
predicted to be less prone to defection when a tipping point is clearly identified—that is, a
level ofGHGemissions that is compatiblewith keeping the global temperature increase below
a universally agreed target, such as 2C. Such a threshold for dangerous climate change
transforms the social dilemma inherent in gradual climate change (where free riding on
the effort of others is the dominant strategy) to the relatively simple problem of equilibrium
selection (in this case, coordinating collective action on the agreed goal of limiting GHG
emissions by symmetrically sharing the burden). The fact that the cost of deviating from such
a plan is very high, because of the threat of catastrophe, virtually ensures compliance.
Cooperation in the Climate Commons 7
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Unfortunately, coordination can be undermined by asymmetries in wealth (and past emis-
sions) among countries (Tavoni et al. 2011; Gosnell and Tavoni 2017) and by two forms of
uncertainty that plague climate change negotiations: strategic uncertainty and scientific un-
certainty (Barrett and Dannenberg 2012; Dannenberg et al. 2015). When enough of either
(asymmetry or uncertainty) is present, the “climate negotiation game” reverts to a prisoner’s
dilemma, whereby countries would be better off cutting emissions, but delay action indefi-
nitely in the pursuit of their self-interest. The theory underlying this finding is intuitive: a
sufficiently high degree of asymmetry or uncertainty (about the other actors or about the
location of the threshold) effectively removes the coordination mechanism and brings us
back to the unhelpful world of strategic substitutes.
Design features for deeper cooperation
In light of the previous discussion, scholars sought to identify design features that may be
conducive to effective international environmental agreements. More specifically, the game-
theoretic literature on international environmental agreements has identified mechanisms
that have the potential to increasemitigation efforts.2Thesemechanisms range from expand-
ing the strategy space via side payments and issue linkage (Barrett 2005), to introducing
minimum participation rules and open membership (Weikard,Wangler, and Freytag 2015),
to imposing trade restrictions on nonparticipants (Nordhaus 2015). European politicians
appear to believe that issue linkage may be helpful. For example, in a 2018 address to the
French parliament, Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne, the French Foreign Affairs Secretary of State,
reiterated that France will insist that the stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership between the European Union (EU) and the United States never be revived if
President Donald Trump carries through on his promise to leave the Paris Agreement: “No
Paris Agreement, no trade agreement. The US knows what to expect.”3 Similar rhetoric
concerning new trade deals can be heard from the EU, where Cecilia Malmstrom, the EU’s
trade chief, announced that a binding reference to the Paris Agreement would be required in
all EU trade agreements, such as the upcoming ones with the South American trade bloc
Mercosur. The current provisions, however, may create an incentive for countries to remain
in the agreement, but do little to ensure compliance with voluntary national pledges.
Another strand of the literature on international environmental agreements examines the
dynamics of climate agreements of variable length. Harstad (2016) finds that the combined
problem of too much pollution and too little investment in green technologies is mitigated
when strong property rights can be enforced. In a similar setting, Battaglini and Harstad
(2015) find that when investments in green technologies are noncontractible, wide partici-
pation in environmental agreements and little free riding can be rationalized by countries’
desire to avoid the holdup problem associated with renegotiating short-term agreements.
This occurs because only large coalitions commit to long-term treaties.
2The standardmodels predict either the formation of a large stable coalition that does little abatement (large
but shallow) or a small stable coalition undertaking greater mitigation efforts by few signatories (small but
deep), both of which translate into unambitious treaties achievingmodest targets. See de Zeeuw (2015) for a
recent review.
3https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/opinion/trade-and-climate-how-the-eu-can-
protect-the-paris-agreement/.
8 S. Carattini et al.
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/re
e
p
/a
d
v
a
n
c
e
-a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/d
o
i/1
0
.1
0
9
3
/re
e
p
/re
z
0
0
9
/5
5
3
0
6
6
0
 b
y
 L
o
n
d
o
n
 S
c
h
o
o
l o
f E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 u
s
e
r o
n
 1
7
 J
u
ly
 2
0
1
9
An updated theory of international environmental agreements
The literature has traditionally modeled governments (and the negotiators acting on their
behalf) as rational agents with standard preferences, representing citizens with the same
preferences. That is, decision making is viewed as being the result of the aggregation of
preferences from the Homo economicus described above. A recent strand of literature has
explored the implications of relaxing these assumptions. Examples include introducing eq-
uity preferences (Lange and Vogt 2003; Lange 2006), reference dependence (_Iris¸ and Tavoni
2016), and policymakers’ appetite for campaign contributions (Habla and Winkler 2013;
Marchiori, Dietz, and Tavoni 2017). These departures from the standard assumptions, while
modifying different aspects of the game (either the preferences or the assumption that
governments negotiate as unitary agents, absent lobbying), can rationalize larger coalitions
of contributors, and larger investments to climate change mitigation.
Of particular relevance to the study of climate cooperation, recent contributions to the
international environmental agreements literature introduce reciprocity in their framework.
For example, Hovi, Ward, and Grundig (2015) assume that some countries or blocs (such as
the EU) may be willing to send a costly signal (e.g., by engaging in relatively ambitious
mitigation) in order to credibly reveal their “type” to other conditional cooperators in the
group. When modeled in this way, climate change mitigation follows a stepwise path, with
each step providing a signal to the other players, such that they gradually learn the other
countries’ “types” andmay in turn reciprocate with small but increasingmitigation commit-
ments. These steps may take the form of a tax on domestic emitters, which may be easily
ramped up if others follow suit. The cascading process envisioned by Hovi, Ward, and
Grundig (2015) is reminiscent of the signaling in local dilemmas (discussed earlier), and is
aimed at building trust incrementally. In the Hovi, Ward, and Grundig (2015) model,
countries that are embedded in dense networks, such as important nodes in trade networks,
may have further opportunities to signal their trustworthiness to others, as well as more to
lose in reputational terms when behaving uncooperatively. Buchholz and Sandler (2017) also
observe that during the lead-up to the 2015 COP in Paris, signaling one’s conditional com-
mitment might have provided a “motivational push” for governments to reciprocate others’
efforts. Interestingly, actors such as the EU made their mitigation pledges first, perhaps
leveraging the bottom-up approach to start the process of reciprocation.
There is, of course, a complementary strategic response that pulls governments in the
opposite direction—toward inaction. That is, a country may be concerned about the con-
sequences of undertaking a leadership role in climate mitigation, because of the risk that
stringent targetsmay negatively affect the competitiveness of its industry relative to countries
with unambitious policies. In fact, the threat of such free riding by laggard states has the
potential to induce a vicious cycle of countries decreasing their ambition, which is reinforced
by the same preference for reciprocity that underlies the Paris Agreement’s increases in
ambition over time. This potential destructive impact of reciprocity has long been recognized
in behavioral economics, beginning with Rabin (1993), who pointed out the transformative
role of reciprocity: if two players have sufficiently strong reciprocal preferences, they will
perceive a prisoner’s dilemma game as a coordination game, where both coordination and
defection are equilibria. The first studies to investigate the transformative role of reciprocity
areHadjiyiannis et al. (2012) andNyborg (2018).Hadjiyiannis et al. (2012) find that the effect
Cooperation in the Climate Commons 9
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of reciprocity in a two-country pollution abatement game depends on what the countries
view as fair abatement: if both players havemodest expectations about the other’s abatement,
more cooperation can emerge thanwhen there is no reciprocity. High expectations, however,
destabilize environmental cooperation. Nyborg (2018) casts the problem in the setting of
participation in a coalition formation game among countries acting according to reciprocal
preferences. She finds that reciprocity induces less abatement than standardpreferenceswhen
few other countries abate. Conversely, if enough players have sufficiently strong reciprocal
preferences, either the grand coalition or a majority coalition are stable outcomes. Hence
both studies confirm that reciprocity can either help or hinder mitigation efforts.
Buchholz and Sandler (2017) examine how the constructiveness of reciprocity can be
leveraged by introducing reciprocal preferences in a two-player game with a leader and a
follower. People in the follower country may enjoy some “warm-glow”-like benefit (condi-
tional on others’ contributions) by supporting the common goal of mitigating climate
change. This assumption results in strategic complementarity between each country’s con-
tributions. That is, higher contributions from the leader no longer lead to lower contributions
from the follower; rather, they lead to higher (reciprocal) contributions. Moreover, the fol-
lower country may also influence the leader country through its own contributions. More
specifically, the leader’s effort acts as a signal of goodwill, thus having a “trust-building” effect
on the follower country. The larger the leader’s contributions, the more the follower is likely
to believe that the leader will reciprocate the follower’s effort. Hence Buchholz and Sandler
(2017) conclude that unilateral initiatives would no longer be disadvantageous, suggesting
that leveraging reciprocal preferences may be an effective mechanism for addressing climate
change.
Taking stock
To summarize, the modifications to the standard model that we have discussed here may, to
some extent, ease the collective action problem, casting a more favorable light on the pros-
pects of addressing it, compared to the earlier literature. Thus the models we have reviewed
may help to explain the extent of cooperation observed in the real world. While the current
level of cooperation is still insufficient, it is not negligible and may reflect the fact that we are
undertaking the initial steps in the above-mentioned reciprocal game. However, these
updated theories also hinge on important assumptions. The main assumption we have
been considering here is the one related to conditional cooperation. Is there any empirical
evidence that indicates that such behavior exists in the climate commons? The next section
tackles this question.
Empirical Evidence on the Role of Local Social Norms in the
Climate Commons
Many of the studies discussed in the previous section assume that at least part of the com-
munity is willing to conditionally cooperate. With this in mind, in this section we present
empirical evidence of such behavior, which suggests that local social norms influence people’s
behavior, including when their actions affect the climate commons.We pay special attention
10 S. Carattini et al.
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to the visibility (or salience) of social norms and examine social norms in a decreasing order
of visibility. We start by analyzing peer effects in the presence of very visible behavioral
change, then focus on social interventions that make behaviors observable that would oth-
erwise be invisible, and finally examine the role of beliefs about others’ cooperativeness when
specific behaviors cannot be observed.
Not all situations that we describe in this section concern pure contributions to climate
change mitigation. Some goods also provide private benefits. As theorized in the case of
impure public goods (Kotchen 2006), however, their adoption is not uniquely motivated by
the private benefits. Overall, the evidence presented here follows a common pattern, suggest-
ing that local social norms are a key driver of behavior for decisions that pertain to the climate
commons. Furthermore, we conclude that people appear to be more likely to engage in
cooperative behavior if such behavior is observable to others in the local social environment.
Peer Effects
We focus here on two formsof easily observable proenvironmental behaviors: the adoptionof
photovoltaics and the adoption of hybrid cars. Specifically, we are interested in whether
people are more likely to adopt these behaviors if they observe that others in their local
environment have already adopted such behaviors.
Adoption of photovoltaic technology
Because of their visibility, rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) panels convey information about
the behavior of others in a given community (i.e., the local social norm). Empirical evidence
of peer effects in the adoption of rooftop PV technology adoption has been identified in
California (Bollinger and Gillingham 2012), Connecticut (Graziano and Gillingham 2015),
Germany (Rode andWeber 2016), and Switzerland (Baranzini, Carattini, andPeclat 2017). In
fact, Baranzini, Carattini, and Peclat (2017) show that solar panels that can be installed on
facades and steep roofs (building-integrated PV), which means they are more visible, lead to
greater adoption by others (more new installations of any type) than the standard building-
attached photovoltaics. While the adoption of solar panels may have financial drivers, the
literature suggests that both proenvironmental and prosocial motives also play an important
role in driving behavior. For example, Islam (2014) shows that emissions abatement is among
the factors encouraging higher PV adoption, even when controlling for energy savings. Palm
(2018) confirms this finding, especially for early adopters. Kwan (2012) finds that commu-
nities in the United States that lean towards the Democratic Party tend to have higher adop-
tion of PVs, even when controlling for economic incentives and electricity cost.
Adoption of hybrid vehicles
Hybrid cars provide further evidence on the role of visibility in determining peer effects in the
adoption of green technologies. As shown by Narayanan and Nair (2013), peer effects drive
the adoption of hybrid cars in California, but only for the Toyota Prius Hybrid and not, for
instance, for theHondaCivicHybrid.While thePrius exists only in its hybrid formand is thus
immediately identified as a green car, the hybrid versions of the Civic look exactly like their
nonhybrid versions (Narayanan and Nair 2013). This suggests that “going green” seems to
Cooperation in the Climate Commons 11
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lead to peer effects only when such behavior is sufficiently visible. Using data on vehicle
purchases in the states of Colorado andWashington, Sexton and Sexton (2014) show that in
areas with stronger environmental preferences (defined as those in which the share of resi-
dents registered asDemocrats is high), themarket share of Priuses grew faster than themarket
share of any other hybrid cars. The authors estimate that in states in which the share of
Democrat voters is high, and proenvironmental behavior is thus more likely to be socially
rewarded, people are willing to pay a premium of up to $4200 to drive a Prius (and hence
signal their “greenness”) rather than another hybrid car with comparable characteristics.
Social Interventions
In many cases the norm is not directly visible but can be made visible through external
intervention. An increasing number of studies have focused on information campaigns
and social interventions aimed at influencing individuals’ perception of the social norm,
especially when the social norm is sufficiently high (i.e., a given behavior is relatively wide-
spread). Although there is extensive literature on the role of information provision in the
adoptionof proenvironmental behavior (e.g., Cohen andViscusi 2012), we focus here on a set
of interventions in which information is provided on the behavior of peers with the objective
of encouraging the adoption of such behavior.
Descriptive and injunctive norms
Following Cialdini (2003), descriptive norms (about what people do) have been increasingly
combined with injunctive norms (about what people should do) in order to redirect citizens’
behavior toward socially preferable alternatives. Schultz et al. (2007) apply this approach to a
field experiment on household energy consumption and treat a community in California as
follows. A descriptive-norm treatment, providing information on the neighborhood’s aver-
age energy consumption as well as on the household’s past consumption, is assigned to all
participants, whereas an additional injunctive-norm treatment is assigned only to a randomly
selected sample. The injunctive-norm treatment consists of receiving a positively (negatively)
valenced emoticon depending on whether the household’s energy consumption was below
(above) average. The authors find that the descriptive-norm treatment leads households to
converge toward the level of consumption of their neighbors, so that the level of energy
consumption of those households that were above the mean prior to the treatment decreases
(intended effect), but, at the same time, the level of energy consumption of those that were
below the mean prior to the treatment increases (unintended effect). This unintended
(“boomerang”) effect suggests that “bad” environmental behavior can be as contagious as
“good” environmental behavior (see also Dur and Vollaard 2015). However, Schultz et al.
(2007) also show that this perverse boomerang effect can be addressed by reverting to in-
junctive norms. More specifically, the combination of descriptive and injunctive norms
results in a decrease in the amount of energy consumed by households above the mean,
but no significant change in behavior is observed for the households below the mean. Thus,
when injunctive norms are added, the convergence that is observed is not toward the de-
scriptive norm, but rather toward the low and desirable level of consumption of below-
average households. This suggests that when descriptive norms are used in combination
12 S. Carattini et al.
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with injunctive norms, people tend to replicate the behavior of the more cooperative indi-
viduals in their local context.Note that the presence of a boomerang effect, with an increase in
energy consumption for below-average households, supports the idea that themain driver of
behavior is the local social norm, not potential economic savings.
Larger interventions
A similar experimentwas conducted on amuch larger scale on behalf of several utilities by the
companyOpower, which provided treated households with home energy reports designed to
spur energy conservation. Allcott and Rogers (2014) find that people respond to the com-
parison of their energy consumption with the energy consumption of their neighbors (and
with their own past energy consumption) even after several reports, and that the program
continues to be effective in reducing energy consumption even after half a decade and also
after being discontinued. Although there was, of course, some backsliding, average treatment
effects in the discontinued-treatment groupwere still on the order of0.5 kWh/day two years
after the program was discontinued. The cost-effectiveness analysis in Allcott and Rogers
(2014) confirms just how powerful social norms can be, although the Opower intervention
provides (in a unique report) information about neighbors and the households own level of
consumption, which does not allow for disentangling the effect of the descriptive norm from
information on one’s own consumption.
Observability is also the key feature of another behavioral intervention, fostering voluntary
participation in “demand response” programs (see Yoeli et al. 2013). In these programs, a
pool of households agrees to have their energy consumption remotely controlled and poten-
tially reduced during demand peaks to prevent blackouts and cost spikes. By sacrificing
comfort if their appliances are switched off, each participating household provides a small
contribution to the public good. In a large field experiment based on more than 2,000
participants, Yoeli et al. (2013) found that sharing information about who among the neigh-
bors is participating in the program induces much more participation than a monetary
reward of $25, and argue that even amonetary reward of about $170may still be less effective
than making others’ participation observable. Observability is only shown to matter for
individuals who believe that voluntary participation in a demand response program is a
public good, thus suggesting that an inclination to cooperate (or reciprocate) is a necessary
condition for behavioral change. Greater effects are found for people who live in apartment
buildings rather thanhouses; according toYoeli et al. (2013), this difference is likely due to the
many more interactions between neighbors in the former case.
Pure provision of a global public good
Although in the experimental settings of Schultz et al. (2007) and Allcott and Rogers (2014)
households could also save money by changing their behavior in the ways encouraged by the
experimenters, behavioral interventions have also been found to be effective when the cost of
contributing to the public good is clearly positive. For example, Lindman, Ek, and So¨derholm
(2013) recruit a sample of Swedish students and analyze their willingness to pay for carbon
offsets; they find that the students’ purchase of carbon offsets is a positive function of the
participation figures that the authors provide for the population overall, suggesting that
making the local norm visible may also be effective when people are asked to contribute to
Cooperation in the Climate Commons 13
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a global public good. The numbers given for the overall population (10%, 30%, 50%, and
70%) are, however, false, and include deliberately high figures. Although the use of deception
can generally be challenged on several grounds, the findings of Lindman, Ek, and So¨derholm
(2013) may suggest that cooperation could be spurred by showing large figures, for example,
for a subsample of the population that behaves in a particularly climate-friendly way.
Less Visible Social Norms
In most cases, however, it is particularly hard to infer the extent to which others are coop-
erating. When the level of cooperation of others is uncertain, we can expect people to form
beliefs about it and behave accordingly. It is an empirical question whether one’s expectation
of a high level of cooperation in a given environment leads one to reciprocate. The researchwe
have surveyed thus far suggests that the visibility of the local norm may result in increased
provision of climate change mitigation, although with exceptions and mixed evidence (e.g.,
Bolsen et al. 2014) . The next step consists of assessing whether this relationship also holds
when norm visibility is limited, such that individuals must rely on subjective beliefs about
others’ choices.
Recent evidence suggests that the relationship may hold, to some degree. For example, in
a study of Swiss individuals’ willingness to pay for climate change mitigation, Blasch and
Farsi (2012) find that the private demand for carbon offsets depends positively on “people’s
expectation about the percentage of Swiss consumers that participates in voluntary carbon
offsetting schemes” (p. 20). In a similar setting, Schwirplies and Ziegler (2016) use survey
data to examine the willingness to pay for climate change mitigation in Germany and the
United States (measured in terms of hypothetical demand for carbon offsets and other
environmentally friendly products). The authors consider many variables that determine
the stated adoption of carbon offsets and the willingness to pay a premium for green
products, including a variable called “expectation of society,” which measures people’s
expectation of the level of cooperation of others. Schwirplies and Ziegler (2016) find that
this variable is positively correlated with stated environmental behavior in the U.S. sample,
but find no significant effect for the German sample. The positive relationship between the
variable “expectation of society” and stated environmental behavior in the United States
corroborates the findings of Blasch and Farsi (2012), suggesting that expectations about
other people’s behavior, at the local level, influence contributions to climate change
mitigation.
Trust
The evidence from peer effects, social interventions, and other situations in which local
norms are less visible suggests that the local context is an important driver of the adoption
of climate-friendly behavior. A natural question is whether these microeconomic relation-
ships between local social norms and proenvironmental behavior translate into broader,
measurable relationships between societal cooperativeness and environmental outcomes
measured at the subnational or national level. An emerging literature has addressed this
question by looking at trust as a measure of a country’s culture of cooperation.
14 S. Carattini et al.
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Trust has been indicated not only as one of the keys for the successful management of open
access resources, but also as an important determinant of prosperity (Fukuyama 1995). The
beneficial effect of trust on economic development has also been identified empirically
(cf. Algan and Cahuc 2013). Here we extend the analysis to the role of trust in shaping
cooperative behavior in the climate commons.
Owen and Videras (2008) investigate the relationship between trust, measured by the
widely usedWorld Values Survey, and efforts to pursue the goals of sustainable development
by many municipalities in 60 different countries. Using cross-sectional regressions, the
authors find a positive correlation between a country’s level of trust and its adoption of
Agenda 21 programs, an initiative that builds on local sustainable development projects.
Based on observations for 29 European countries between 1990 and 2007, Carattini et al.
(2015) find a negative correlation between trust and GHG emissions, suggesting that a
countries’ culture of cooperation matters for their cooperativeness in the climate commons.
To further investigate this issue, Carattini and Jo (2018) rely on an identification strategy
developed by Algan and Cahuc (2010), who studied the relationship between trust and eco-
nomic growth, to provide causal evidence on the relationship between trust and CO2 emis-
sions. They find that the inherited trust of descendants of immigrants to the United States,
which serves as a measure of trust in their country of origin, is a significant factor in explain-
ing changes in CO2 emissions observed between 1950 and 2010 across 26 countries around
theworld. To confirm that the effect of trust is not confounded by other variables, the authors
run a placebo test for the period between 1920 and 1980. Because there was almost no
awareness of anthropogenic climate change between 1920 and 1980, and hence no reason
for the culture of cooperation to influence emissions, Carattini and Jo (2018) find no effect of
trust on GHG emissions during this time period.
Tam and Chan (2018) provide an interesting explanation for the observed relationship
between trust and GHG emissions. More specifically, they investigate the gap between envi-
ronmental concern and (self-reported) proenvironmental behavior and provide correlational
evidence that trust plays amoderating role in the relationship between environmental concern
and proenvironmental behavior. This finding suggests that the gap between environmental
concern and proenvironmental behavior is smaller in countries where trust is high—that is,
when people expect others to also translate their concern into action.
The evidence provided by Tam and Chan (2018) is consistent with Allo and Loureiro
(2014), who review a large number of empirical studies on the willingness to pay for climate
change mitigation and perform a meta-analysis to explain the social and cultural determi-
nants of the cross-country differences that they observe in the sample. They find that coun-
tries with a high propensity to conform to social norms are characterized by a high
willingness-to-pay for climate change mitigation. Based on data for residential energy con-
sumption in the United Kingdom, Volland (2017) finds a negative correlation between the
level of trust stated by respondents and their reported level of energy consumption, with a
one-step increase in trust (measured on a 10-point scale) being correlated with a decrease of
about 1 percent in energy consumption. These findings further confirm the role of the culture
of cooperation in driving behavior in the climate commons.
Cooperation in the Climate Commons 15
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Summary and Conclusions
Standard economic theory predicts that there should be little cooperation in the climate
commons, beyond what can be rationalized on the basis of the expected benefits that can
be appropriated from undertaking mitigation effort. We have reviewed recent evidence on
the adoption of behaviors with implications for climate changemitigation and conclude that
individuals are, to some extent, inclined to behave cooperatively in the face of this global
dilemma. That is, when tackling climate change (as in other domains), individuals are more
willing to cooperate than standard theory predicts. We have focused on local social norms,
which allowed us to examine the roots of a wide range of cooperative behaviors observed in
the climate commons. The evidence points to a largely untapped potential for leveraging
human proclivities for cooperation, which are typically observed in local commons, in order
to contribute to the provision of the global public good of climate mitigation.
Themainmessage from the reviewed literature is that local social norms are likely to play a
prominent part in triggering individual climate-friendly behavior, because these norms ap-
pear to be instrumental in explaining some of the observed cooperative behavior. Thus we
conclude that the potential for a virtuous societal change toward environmentally friendly
behavior crucially hinges on how visible and widespread such behavior—and hence the
norm—is. That is, the more prevalent and the more observable the behavior, the more likely
it is to be locally adopted by others. As a result, interventions can play a key role in facilitating
behavioral change, for instance, by increasing the visibility of otherwise invisible behaviors
such as green energy adoption. Such interventionswouldnot onlymake the social normmore
salient, but also create social rewards for those individuals that engage in cooperative behav-
ior. However, social interventions that rely on descriptive norms may backfire if such be-
havior is rarely adopted, as is the case with carbon offsets. Given the important ethical and
practical drawbacks of deception, strategies need to be developed to kick-start and foster
contagion even when the initial adoption level is low. This requires researchers and policy-
makers to find creative ways to adapt social interventions to leverage the example of early
adopters.
The empirical literature also suggests that in addition to fostering cooperation in local
environmental dilemmas and economic growth, trust and the culture of cooperation of a
society are beneficial for tackling global dilemmas. The challenge here is finding ways to
increase trust.While cultural aspects of a society tend to be rather persistent, economists have
suggested using education to spur civic spirit and increase cooperation. However, these are
long-term investments, which themselves present a collective action problem. In the short
run, interventions aimed at increasing the observability of cooperative behavior may already
contribute to build trust among relevant actors.
The empirical evidence we have reviewed and discussed here does not match the standard
economic theory, which provides rather negative predictions about our ability to reach an
effective agreement to tackle climate change. Although the conventional literature is consis-
tent with the sluggish achievements of decades of negotiations, it is at odds with the recent
emergence of bottom-up approaches to cooperation in the climate commons, including
subnational initiatives and the new regime agreed to at the Paris COP in 2015. The Paris
Agreement’s departure from the top-down architecture of its predecessors suggests a need for
16 S. Carattini et al.
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further research on international environmental agreements, with amore prominent role for
domestic politics, including voters and environmental organizations. In this article we have
identified a set of recent studies in the international environmental agreements literature that
goes beyond standard assumptions, and which may already provide a better fit to real-world
observations. We refer to this literature as an updated theory of international environmental
agreements.
While we have yet to see how the voluntary nature of the nationally determined contri-
butions of the Paris Agreement will play out, it is important to note that the U.S. decision to
withdraw from the agreement did not lead to a cascade of withdrawals. Instead, some coun-
tries appear to be pushing for a club approach (Nordhaus 2015). For example, French
President Macron organized a climate summit in December 2017 for “committed coopera-
tors only,” and the EU has suggested tying international trade and climate cooperation to-
gether. It remains to be seen whether the initiatives discussed here will induce enough actors
to commit to, and actually undertake, substantial mitigation efforts that are sufficient to
trigger a large-scale virtuous change.
In the meantime, we encourage policymakers to consider and test the potential of club
approaches and schemes that leverage reciprocal preferences at multiple scales. That is, com-
mon patterns of behavior need to be identified and, ideally, leveraged to meaningfully con-
tribute to global abatement, well beyond the current levels of cooperation. Fortunately,
policymakers and organizations can draw insights from a growing number of domestic
interventions. These initiatives, someofwhichwe have discussed here, can be used to leverage
people’s prosocial and proenvironmental attitudes to increase contributions to climate
change mitigation.
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Abstract
Climate change is a global externality that has proven difficult to address through
formal institutions alone due to the public good properties of climate change mit-
igation and the lack of a supranational institution for enforcing global treaties.
Given these circumstances, which are arguably the most challenging for interna-
tional cooperation, commitment problems and free-riding incentives for countries
to delay costly mitigation efforts are major obstacles to effective environmental
agreements. Starting from this premise, we examine domestic mitigation efforts,
with the goal of assessing the extent to which the willingness of individuals to
contribute voluntarily to the public good of climate mitigation could be scaled
up to the global level. Although individual environmental actions are clearly insuf-
ficient for achieving ambitious global mitigation targets, we argue that they are
nevertheless initial and essential steps in the right direction. In fact, individual and
community efforts may be particularly important if local interventions encourage
shifts in norms and behaviors that favor large-scale transformations. With this in
mind, we discuss the importance of the visibility of norms and the role of beliefs
when such visibility is lacking and their implications for leveraging cooperative
behavior to increase climate mitigation efforts locally and globally. (JEL: D70, F59,
H23, M30, Q54, Q58)
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